One important component of network reprogramming is code dissemination, when the updated program code is distributed to the relevant nodes. Very few code dissemination protocols tolerate transient faults that corrupt the state and these faults can cause the old code to disseminate in the network. We propose two protocols called BestEffort-Repair and Consistent-Repair that transform faultintolerant code dissemination protocols into non-masking fault-tolerant protocols where, eventually, all nodes obtain the new code. We conduct experiments with both protocols on TelosB-like motes and over TOSSIM simulations to show their correctness and also their performance. We conduct a case study whereby both protocols are added to a state-of-the-art code dissemination protocol, viz. Varuna to evaluate their impact on Varuna. Our results show that (i) Varuna, which is fault-intolerant, is transformed into a stabilizing code dissemination protocol (ii) they induce low overhead on Varuna, and causes all nodes to eventually receive the new code. BestEffort-Repair is biased towards fast recovery whereas Consistent-Repair attempts to reduce the number of erroneous downloads in the network. Our main contribution is the first corrector protocols that correct code dissemination in the presence of transient faults.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have enabled the deployment of several novel classes of applications, such as monitoring and tracking. However, to be useful, they need to operate unattended for long periods of time. This operational mode places several requirements on the network applications, but mainly that the applications are able to adapt to changing conditions. Given that WSNs are often deployed in hostile or treacherous environments, human intervention is impossible. Thus, over-the-air reprogramming becomes a fundamental activity.
A network reprogramming protocol consists of several specific components: (i) a component that decides whether a complete code needs to be sent or only an update, (ii) code dissemination component, and (iii) reliability components [1] . The reliability component is to ensure that nodes receive all the parts of the code update that may be lost due to collisions. In this paper, we focus on the code dissemination aspect of network reprogramming.
Several code dissemination protocols have been proposed as part of network reprogramming protocols [2, 3, 4, 5] . However, to the best of our knowledge, none of them tolerates transient data faults, i.e., data faults that corrupt the state of the code dissemination protocol. Transient data faults, which are also known as soft errors, are known to occur in WSNs [6, 7, 8, 9] . Given that several code dissemination protocols work by advertising the metadata, viz. version number 1 , of the new code, e.g., [3, 4, 10, 11] , any corruption of the version number in the advertisement messages or those stored at the nodes can, in the worst case, lead to the network nodes having stale code, thereby reducing the ability of the network to perform properly. Similarly, any state corruption can lead, in the worst case, to nodes downloading stale code (we will show this later). Thus, it is important to make these code dissemination S. Saginbekov, A. Jhumka protocols tolerate these transient data faults.
When a node decides that another node has an updated code fragment, generally, it makes a request to the updated node which, subsequently, sends (i.e., broadcasts) the update to the requesting node. The process of advertising code updates, sending code requests and downloads is energy consuming. As the communication part consumes a large portion of energy and the significant amount of energy per transmitted bit used [12] , and given the size of codes, which may vary from 20 bytes up to tens of kilobytes [2, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16] , code dissemination consumes a significant amount of energy. This is exacerbated when transient faults occur, as nodes may mistakenly request and download stale code. In the worst case, the whole network may download the stale code, at great energy expense.
There exists a hierarchy of fault tolerance properties namely fail-safe fault tolerance (which ensures that a program always satisfies its safety specification), nonmasking fault tolerance (which ensures that a program always satisfy its liveness specification) and masking fault tolerance (which ensures that both safety and liveness are satisfied, even in the presence of transient faults) [17] . In the context of code dissemination, failsafe fault tolerance amounts to a node not downloading any code if it believes the code to be old. Masking fault tolerance means that all nodes will only download the new code (as if no fault has occurred), and only once. On the other hand, non-masking fault tolerance allows some erroneous downloads (i.e., downloads of old code) before eventually all nodes download the updated code. Such erroneous downloads are only allowed to occur finitely, though.
Given that code update dissemination is energy consuming, it is thus preferable to reduce the number of erroneous downloads while ensuring that all nodes eventually download the updated code.
Fail-safe fault tolerance is not suitable as it means that some nodes may not update (which will impact of the usefulness of the network). Masking fault-tolerant code dissemination protocols would minimise the number of erroneous downloads but, given the nature of the WSNs and of the dissemination process, masking fault tolerance is not practical. On the other hand, non-masking fault tolerance means that nodes may erroneously download old code only finitely, but they will eventually download the updated code. However, a small number of erroneous downloads can be tolerated if this means that the network state is consistent, allowing the proper dissemination of the updated code.
To design non-masking fault tolerance, it is both necessary and sufficient for a program to contain a specific type of fault tolerance component called a corrector. A corrector is a class of program component that enforces a predicate on the execution of a program. There exists different correctors that can guarantee non masking fault tolerance for a given program, however they may differ in their efficiency. In this work, instead of proposing a specific non-masking fault-tolerant code dissemination protocol 2 for WSNs, we address the problem in a different way: we first provide an abstract specification of the code dissemination problem, and based on the definition, we propose (i) a definition of a corrector protocol and (ii) two corrector protocols, called BestEffort-Repair and Consistent-Repair. Each can be added to any existing (fault-intolerant) code dissemination protocol to transform it into a faulttolerant code dissemination protocol.
Specifically, since the corrector protocol is designed based on the code dissemination specification, rather than on an actual implementation, if the corrector is added to any code dissemination implementation that satisfies the dissemination specification, then the resulting protocol is non-masking fault tolerant [18] . Further, to detect state corruption, a detector component, which detects the validity of a predicate in a given state, is designed based on the protocol implementation.
The two corrector protocols developed has enabled us to observe a tradeoff during recovery: Consistent-Repair results in a lesser number of erroneous downloads than BestEffort-Repair. However, BestEffort-Repair has a shorter completion time in that Consistent-Repair needs more time to make better update decision. A shorter recovery time means that the network state becomes consistent faster, and can perform useful work faster.
Overall, our approach is as follows: given a fault-intolerant code dissemination protocol, we design a protocol-specific detector together with a generic corrector component to obtain a corresponding nonmasking fault-tolerant code dissemination protocol.
Contributions In this context, we make the following contributions:
• We formalise the concept of code dissemination in WSN, and provide three refined specifications, viz., strong, consistent and best effort code dissemination.
• We show that (i) there is no deterministic algorithm that solve strong code dissemination in presence of transient faults, and (ii) there is no deterministic 1-local algorithm that solves strong code dissemination in presence of a stronger class of transient faults, called detectable faults.
• We present two novel f -local algorithms called (i)
BestEffort-Repair and (ii) Consistent-Repair that, when added to any fault-intolerant code dissemination protocol, solves (i) BestEffort code dissemination and (ii) Consistent code dissemination, and we prove the correctness of both protocols.
• We run experiments and simulations on our protocol using TelosB platform-based motes and TOSSIM [19] , respectively, and show their correctness and performance, especially the locality property of the protocols.
• We present a case study where we add both protocols to an existing code dissemination algorithm, namely Varuna [4] . We instrument Varuna with a specific detector which triggers the protocols upon detection of an error. We show that both BestEffort-Repair and Consistent-Repair induce very little overhead on Varuna in presence of detectable transient faults. Further, Varuna, when executed in presence of even a single transient fault, resulted in all the nodes downloading the wrong code. In contrast, when running Varuna with both protocols, all the nodes eventually obtained the new code.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present an overview of related work. In Section 3, we present the system and fault models assumed in the paper. We present a definition and specifications for code dissemination in the context of network reprogramming in Section 4.
We present some theoretical results in Section 5. In Section 6, we present two f -local corrector algorithms that stabilise the code dissemination of code updates. We present the experimental setup and results to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms in Section 7. In Section 8, we present a case study where we add the algorithms to an existing code dissemination protocol to show the viability of our approach. We discuss aspects of our approach in Section 9, and we conclude the paper in Section 10.
RELATED WORK

Code Dissemination
There currently exists several dissemination protocols which update the running code on nodes to new ones. While some of the protocols deliver complete binary image of the code, like [2, 10, 13, 20] , some other protocols deliver only the difference between the new code and the old code [21, 22] . There also exists protocols which deliver tasks [23] , network parameters [24] , and queries [25] .
In XNP [13] , the base station broadcasts the code image to the nodes which are in its coverage range. The nodes outside of the range cannot receive the code image. The protocol proposed in MOAP [20] is a multihop dissemination protocol that can deliver code images to nodes that are several hops away from the base station. Each node forwards the code image further after receiving the complete code image.
Deluge [10] allows large data transmission by fragmenting data into fixed-size pages. It also supports pipelined page transmission to make dissemination faster. Unlike MOAP, the nodes in Deluge should not wait for complete code image before forwarding it. The authors of MNP [2] propose another protocol like Deluge which fragments the code image and uses the pipelining mechanism. However, unlike Deluge, MNP selects the sender of the code such that there is only one sender at a time in a neighbourhood. Sender selection reduces collision and addresses the hidden terminal problem. Also, in MNP, some of the nodes can go to the sleep mode to save energy whenever there is no data to receive or transmit.
Because of the features of WSNs, such as transient link failures and node mobility, not all nodes may update their code during dissemination phase. The Trickle algorithm [3] addresses this problem by using a "polite gossip" policy.
In Trickle, every node broadcasts advertisement messages about the code. The advertisement message is basically metadata, that includes version number 3 , of the code, at most once per period given between [τ /2, τ ]. If a node hears more than k identical metadata before it transmits, it suppresses its broadcast and doubles the value of τ up to τ h , which is upper bound for τ . If it hears different metadata τ becomes τ l , which is lower bound for τ .
Varuna [4] is another protocol which supports code update maintenance. This protocol saves energy in the steady phase,where no dissemination is being done. Unlike Trickle, where there is a linear increase of energy consumption -due to polite gossiping, energy consumption in Varuna is constant in steady phase (i.e., when there is no new code update in the network). To achieve constant energy consumption in steady phase, nodes in Varuna send advertisement messages only when there is a change in the neighbourhood topology or metadata since its last advertisement transmission. Finally, there exists code dissemination frameworks that target the reconfigurations of a subset of nodes in the network, rather than requiring all the nodes to be updated [26, 27] .
These protocols do not consider transient memory faults that corrupt the state of the running code dissemination program, including the protocol messages, which may lead to the dissemination protocol to work incorrectly. For example, a node with new code may download old code if such a fault occurs. To the best of our knowledge, the work presented in this paper is the first to address code dissemination in the presence of transient faults.
Fault Tolerance
In [28] , it has been shown that a class of components, known as correctors, is sufficient to design non-masking fault tolerance.
Stabilisation, which is a special type of non-masking fault tolerance, is achieved by adding corrector mechanisms to a program, thereby transforming the program into a stabilising faulttolerant one. Correctors are components that enforce a given predicate on program executions, whenever the predicate has been violated.
The area of self-stabilization is mature, and several stabilizing algorithms exist for several important problems [29] .
Reliable Broadcast
Since we focus on code dissemination protocols, the problem of reliable broadcast is relevant. We provide a brief survey here. The work proposed in [30] is one of the earliest work that deal with the broadcast problem in multihop radio networks. They propose fault-tolerant broadcasting algorithms and give their asymptotic bounds on completion time. They assume that faulty nodes are permanent of unknown locations and do not receive and send messages. Also they consider line and grid as an underlying network topology.
In [31] , the author shows that it is possible to obtain reliable broadcast whenever the number of Byzantine nodes, nodes which may behave arbitrarily, f , is no more than some value. And this f is defined in terms of a communcation range r. Moreover, the author shows that it is impossibe to obtain reliable broadcast when f is bigger than some threshold value. The work assumes a grid network and the existence of a prefixed schedule and everyone follows to this schedule to avoid collisions. In [32] , the authors improve on [31] by making possibility bounds tighter. In particular, it has been shown that it is possible to achieve reliable broadcast when the number of faulty(Byzantine) nodes is strictly less than the threshold value for which in [31] it is showed that it is impossible to achieve reliable broadcast.
In [33] , unlike the previous work where there is no address spoofing and collision, the authors relaxed this assumption and showed that reliable broadcast is possible even in the presence collisions and address spoofing as long as they are bounded and the number of faulty nodes is less than some threshold value.
In [34] , the authors address the broadcast problem in the presence of Byzantine faults with faulty nodes having bounded number of messages m f . They show the possibility of reliable broadcast whenever the number of messages, m, of the correct node is lower bounded by some value defined in terms of m f . They assume the existence of a prefixed time-slotted schedule, but faulty nodes may not follow the schedule thereby making collisions.
In [35] , the authors propose a protocol which is safe, i.e., correct nodes do not download an incorrect message.
The protocol guarantees this property whenever D ≥ H + 2, where D is the shortst distance between two Byzantine nodes and H is a prorocol parameter which is assumed to be known by all correct nodes. The paper also discusses the possibility of reliable broadcast in the torus network whenever D ≥ 5 and H = 2. The same authors generalized this result to planar graphs in [36] . In particular, the authors show that for D > Z, where Z is the maximal number of edges per polygon, it is possible to achieve reliable broadcast.
MODELS: SYSTEM AND FAULTS
Graphs and Networks
We define a wireless sensor node as a computing device equipped with a wireless interface and associated with a unique identifier. Communication in wireless networks is typically modelled with a circular communication range centred on the node. With this model, a node is thought as able to exchange data with all devices within its communication range.
A wireless sensor network is a collection of wireless sensor nodes and is modelled as a directed graph G = (V, A), where V is the set of wireless sensor nodes of size |V |, and A is a set of arcs or directed links. Each directed link is an ordered pair of distinct nodes (m, n), meaning node m can communicate with node n. For a directed link (m, n), we call n (respectively, m) a downstream neighbour (respectively, a upstream neighbour ) of m (respectively, n). We denote by M d (respectively, M u ), the set of m's downstream (respectively, upstream) neighbours. We also assume that, for every node m, M d , M u = ∅. Whenever we say a node n sends (resp. receives) a message, we mean n sends (resp. receives) the message to its downstream (resp. from its upstream) neighbours
The d-hop neighbourhood of a node m, denoted by M d , is a set of nodes such that the length of the shortest path from m to a node in the set is at most d. We say that two nodes m and n can collide at node p if (m, p), (n, p) ∈ A 4 .
Distributed Programs
We model the processing on a WSN node as a process containing non-empty sets of variables and actions. A distributed program P is then a finite set of communicating processes. We represent the communication network of a distributed program by a directed connected graph G = (V, A), where V is the set of processes and A is a set of directed links. A link (m, n) ∈ A means that a process m can communicate with a process n. A variable v i takes values from a fixed and finite domain D i . We denote a variable v i of process n by n.v i . Each process n has a special channel variable, denoted by n.ch, modelling a FIFO queue of incoming data sent by other nodes. This variable is defined over the set of (possibly infinite) message sequences. Every variable of every process, including the channel variable, has a set of initial values. The state of a program P is an assignment to variables of values from their respective domains. The set of initial states is the set of all possible assignments of initial values to variables of the program. A state is called initial if it is in the set of initial states. The state space of the program is the set of all possible value assignments to variables. An action a at process n updates one or more variables of n atomically.
Semantics
Program
We model a distributed program as a transition system P = (Σ, I, ∆), where Σ is the state space, I ⊆ Σ the set of initial states, and ∆ ⊆ Σ × Σ the set of state transitions (or steps). A computation of P is a maximal sequence of states s 0 ·s 1 . . . such that ∀i > 0, (s i−1 , s i ) ∈ ∆. If the computation is finite, then it terminates in a final state. A state s of a computation is final if there is no state s such that (s, s ) ∈ ∆.
In a given state s, several processes may be ready to execute, and a decision is needed to decide which one(s) execute. A scheduler is a predicate over the set of computations. In any computation, each step (s, s ) is obtained by the fact that a non-empty subset of enabled processes atomically execute an action. This subset is chosen according to the scheduler. A scheduler is said to be central [37] if it chooses only one ready process to execute an action in any step. A scheduler is said distributed [38] if it chooses at least one ready process to execute an action in any execution step. A scheduler may also have some fairness properties [29] . A scheduler is strongly fair if every process that is ready infinitely often is chosen infinitely often to execute an action in a step. A scheduler is weakly fair if every continuously ready process is eventually chosen to execute an action in a step. A synchronous scheduler is a distributed scheduler where all ready processes are chosen to execute an action in a step.
In this paper, we assume a synchronous scheduler, capturing a synchronous system where an upper bound exists on the time for a process to execute an action. This assumption is not unreasonable as WSNs are often time-synchronized to either correlate sensor readings from different devices. Overall, in this paper, we assume a synchronous system model.
Specification
A specification is a set of computations. A program P satisfies a specification Φ if every computation of P is in Φ. Alpern and Schneider [39] stated that every computation-based specification can be described as the conjunction of a safety and liveness property. Intuitively, a safety specification states that something bad should not happen, i.e., the safety specification defines a set of computation prefixes that should not appear in any computation. On the other hand, a liveness specification states that something good will eventually happen, i.e., the liveness specification specifies a set of state sequences such that every computation has a suffix in the set.
We assume the specification to be fusion-closed and suffix-closed. A specification is fusion-closed if two computations α · s · β and λ · s · γ are allowed by the specification, then so are the computations α · s · γ and λ · s · β. A specification is suffix-closed if, for every computation allowed by the specification, then so are the suffixes of the computation. The assumption of fusion closure is, in general, reasonable given that conventional specification and implementation languages are fusion closed.
Further, any nonfusion closed specification can be transformed into an equivalent fusion closed one, through the addition of history information [40] .
Communication
We model synchronous communication as follows: after a process i broadcasts a message in state s i , all downstream neighbour processes execute the corresponding receive in state s i+1 , i.e., the corresponding receive is executed before any other enabled actions of process n, such that, in some sense, message deliveries take higher priority.
Faults
Faults typically occur in wireless sensor networks. Due to limited resources such as computing, memory and energy, harsh environmental conditions and buggy programs, wireless sensors may experience a number of different types of faults. As mentioned in [41] , these faults can be classified as node failures and hardware faults, communication faults, and software faults. Some of these faults lead to transient memory corruptions [41] . There have been several works done that are tolerant to transient memory faults or present memory protection mechanisms from some actions that lead to this type of faults [42, 43, 44, 45] . Recently, as reported in [9] , transient faults have occurred with a probability of approximately 0.1% in a large scale deployment and such transient faults severely impact on the efficiency of the protocols. Also, there exists a tool that is designed specifically for wireless sensors to emulate memory faults to check the reactions of software to these faults [46] .
A fault model stipulates the way programs may fail. We consider transient data faults that corrupt the state of the code dissemination program by artificially corrupting the values held by the variables and messages. These faults are also known as soft errors. Formally, our fault model is a set F of faulty actions [28] . These are similar to program actions, as they may modify the variables of programs and thus alter the program state. We say that a fault occurs if a fault action is executed. Fault actions can interleave program actions and they might or might not be executed when enabled. We say a computation is F -affected if the computation contains program transitions and transitions from fault model F . We also assume that the sink is able to retrieve an uncorrupted version of the code and version number (with the sink acting as a gateway), though the sink itself can be corrupted.
Definition 3.1 (Consistent State in Code Dissemination). Given a network G = (V, A) and a code dissemination program Ψ for G, the state of a neighbourhood G of G is said to be consistent in s if there is at most 2 distinct version numbers in that neighbourhood in s, where s is a state of Ψ. A process is said to have a consistent state in s if its code's version number is the same as that of at least one other neighbour process in s. A state of Ψ is consistent in s if all neighbourhoods of G are consistent in s.
Definition 3.2 (F -affected node and F -affected area). Given a network G = (V, A), a fault F that corrupts the program state, an area G = (V , A ), with G being a subgraph of G, is F -affected in a state s iff ∃V ⊆ V .∀n ∈ V , n may need to change its state to make the state of V consistent. We call such a node n an F -affected node in s 5 .
When a node changes its state to make the program state consistent, we say that the node corrects its state. Definition 3.3 (Stabilizing algorithm). Given a network G = (V, A), a problem specification Φ for G, and an algorithm Ψ. Algorithm Ψ is said to be stabilizing to Φ iff every computation of Ψ has a suffix which is a suffix of a computation of Φ that starts in an initial state. Given a network G = (V, A), a problem specification Φ for G, and a stabilizing algorithm Ψ to Φ. Algorithm Ψ is said to be d-local stabilizing to Φ iff the cost of correcting the state of a node is bounded by functions of d.
SPECIFICATIONS
In this section, we formally define the problem of code dissemination for network reprogramming. We then provide two refined specifications for solving the code dissemination problem: (i) deterministic code dissemination, and (ii) stabilising code dissemination.
Abstract Specification of Code Dissemination
Before we provide problem definitions, we introduce some notations we use in the rest of the paper. We denote a code fragment by (π, v π ), with π being the code and v π being the version number of the code. We denote by v π a possibly corrupted version number for code π, i.e., if v π = v π , then the version number is not corrupted, corrupted otherwise. We say that a code has code fragment (π n , v π n ) to mean that a node n has the code fragment (π, v π ) but has version number v π associated with it instead. Thus, unless stated otherwise, whenever we say a node n has code fragment π, we mean a node n has code fragment (π, v π ).
We assume the version number to be a scalar quantity. We also assume that the version number can grow arbitrarily large.
Definition 4.1 (Code Update). Given two code fragments (π, v π ) and (Π, v Π ), Π is said to be an updated code over π if v Π > v π . If a node n i changes its code from π to Π and Π is a updated code over π, then we say that a node n i updates its code to Π. Otherwise, if a node n i changes its code from Π to π, then we say that a node n i outdates its code to π. We will say that Π is an updated code to mean that Π is an updated over code π, whenever π is clear from the context. We will also say that a node n updates/outdates its code to Π/π if Π and π is obvious from the context.
We now provide an abstract definition of code dissemination as part of a network reprogramming protocol.
Definition 4.3 (Code Dissemination (CD)).
Given a network G = (V, A), with a dedicated node called a sink S ∈ V , and an updated code (Π, v Π ) to be disseminated. Then, a code dissemination for Π is a sequence of sets of receivers R 0 · R 1 . . . R kΠ such that
Given a network G and an updated code Π, the code dissemination process starts with the sink (condition 1). Then, the code update process propagates forward (condition 2), one hop at a time, until all the nodes have received the updated code (condition 3). The sequence represents the sequence in which the nodes updates their code.
In the above definition, we have made three assumptions: (i) when a code dissemination process starts, all the nodes have the same code base, i.e., they all have the same code, (ii) all nodes need to get the updated code (however, we can easily adapt the definition to the case where only a subset of nodes require the code update), and (iii) only one code dissemination can take place at a time, i.e., a code update can only occur once a previous one has completed. We call k Π , the dissemination latency for Π. Observe that condition 2 does not warrant that all the downstream neighbours of an updated node to receive the code update in the next round. Due to issues such as message collisions and duty cycling, a downstream neighbour node may not receive the update in the next round, but sometime later from, possibly, another upstream neighbour.
Local Specifications for Code Dissemination
The specification given in 4.4 is a global specification in the sense that it specifies the expected behaviour at the network level.
In a distributed system, the verification that a program satisfies the global specification is challenging, given that global state is not instantaneously available. Thus, it is preferable to develop node-level specifications, which we call local specifications, which are more amenable to verification. The combination of local specifications (one for each process) result in the global specification.
We now present three increasingly weaker local specifications through which code dissemination could be achieved, which we call (i) strong code dissemination (CD), (ii) consistent CD and (iii) best effort CD. The first specification, strong CD, represents a gold standard and is satisfied by current dissemination protocols, such as [2, 3, 4] . The weaker specifications become important especially when transient faults occur in the network. We will define both specifications in terms of safety and liveness [39] .
Strong Code Dissemination
Intuition In the fault-free case, a node n, having code π, will only download a code from a neighbor node, having code Π, if Π is an updated code. Further, n will not download Π again. Current code dissemination protocols also guarantee that, eventually, every node will download the updated code (even if some nodes are temporarily disconnected from the network, due to duty-cycling, link failures etc).
Thus, we define strong CD as follows (Definition 4.5):
Definition 4.4 (Strong CD). Given a network G = (V, A), a node n ∈ V having a code fragment π, and a new code fragment (Π, v Π ) for G. Then,
• Accuracy: Node n will only change its code to an updated one.
• Update: Eventually node n will permanently update its code to Π.
The liveness part of the specification, i.e., the update property, for strong code dissemination ensures that Definition 4.4) . On the other hand, Definition 4.5, through the accuracy property, puts an additional constraint on code dissemination in that nodes only change their code with an updated one. In other words, 0≤i≤kΠ R Π i = ∅, i.e., no node updates more than once. In general, in the absence of faults, it can be expected that the system will satisfy the strong CD specification, e.g., [3, 4] . However, due to external factors, such as transient faults, nodes may wrongly outdate their codes and, if they do so, they will eventually have to correct these mistakes. These wrong code changes (i.e., code outdates) give rise to various possible weaker specifications, namely (i) consistent CD and (ii) best effort CD.
Consistent Code Dissemination
Intuition When transients fault occur, it may be the case that a node n cannot distinguish between updated and outdated code. Specifically, a node n that has already updated may download the old code from a neighbour, i.e., n becomes outdated, if it believes that the neighbour has the code update. This is not an ideal situation. However, a node m that has yet to be updated may believe that another node m , with the same code as m, has the code update and may wrongly download the same (old) code. This specification forbids a node to outdates itself.
The specification Definition 4.5 (Consistent CD). Given a network G = (V, A), a node n ∈ V having a code fragment π, and a new code fragment (Π, v Π ) for G. Then,
• No outdate: Node n will never change its code to an outdated one.
Best Effort Code Dissemination
Intuition The best effort CD specification allows for an updated node n to outdate itself as n may wrongly believe some node m to have the new code while n has the old code. Definition 4.6 (Best Effort CD). Given a network G = (V, A), a node n ∈ V having a code fragment π, and new code fragment (Π, v Π ) for G. Then,
• Eventual accuracy: Eventually, node n will only change its code to an updated one..
• Liveness: Eventually node n will permanently update its code from π to Π.
An example is used to help better understand and differentiate between the three different specifications proposed. At the start of the dissemination of the new code Π, the old code π resides at every node in the network. Assume that the old code has version 0 and the new code has version 1. Hence, for any node n in the network, there are four possible code transitions in the presence of transient faults: The strong CD specification only allows the second type of code transition. The consistent CD specification allows the 1, 2 and 4 types of code transitions while the best effort CD specification allows all of them. It can be observed then that BestEffort specification allows more redundant downloads than either of the other two specifications.
Fault Tolerance Issues: An Overview
It can happen that a code dissemination protocol that has been proved correct (i.e., satisfies its strong specification in the absence of faults), violates its specification in the presence of faults due to it not being able to handle faults [28] , i.e., the code dissemination protocol is fault-intolerant. As such, there is a variety of fault tolerance properties that the program can satisfy, viz. fail-safe fault tolerance, non-masking fault tolerance and masking fault tolerance [28] . A failsafe fault-tolerant program guarantees that safety will always be satisfied, while a non-masking fault-tolerant program guarantees that liveness will eventually be satisfied, even if safety can be temporarily violated. On the other hand, a masking fault-tolerant program (the gold standard) guarantees that the program will satisfy its specification even in the presence of faults. To transform a fault-intolerant program into a fail-safe fault-tolerant (resp. non-masking faulttolerant) program, addition of program components called detectors (resp. correctors) to the fault-intolerant program are both necessary and sufficient. Thus, to make a program masking fault-tolerant, it is necessary and sufficient to add both detectors and correctors [28] . A detector component is one that asserts the validity of a predicate in a running program, while a corrector component enforces a predicate on a running program.
In networking, a non-masking fault-tolerant program is generally suitable as it guarantees that, eventually (i.e., when faults stop), the program will satisfy its specification again. Though non-masking fault tolerance entails the erroneous downloads of codes, it is the one more suited to code dissemination as masking fault tolerance is very expensive, both spatially and temporally, to guarantee. Given the existence of several code dissemination algorithms, it is not intended, in this work, to develop another (nonmasking) fault-tolerant code dissemination protocol for network reprogramming. The thrust is to develop a generic corrector protocol that, when added to a faultintolerant code dissemination protocol, will enable the resulting protocol to satisfy the liveness specification (i.e., eventually all nodes will permanently update with the updated code). We also require that the corrector protocol is only executed when an erroneous state is detected.
At this point, we need to define the properties of such a corrector protocol that will capture its correctness. Since we wish this corrector protocol to be generic, and work as a wrapper (i.e., it can plug in with various code dissemination protocols), it cannot be based on any specific code dissemination protocol implementation. Rather, the working of the corrector protocol should only be based on the specification of the code dissemination protocol, more specifically its interface and specification. Such an approach is what has been termed as graybox stabilization [18] . • Transparency: In the absence of
If σ w is consistent CD (resp. best effort CD), then φ is a consistent (resp. best effort) corrector for strong CD.
Here, A • B represents the addition of program A with program B [18] . The set of computations of the composite system (A • B) is the smallest fusion-closed set that contains computations of A and B, with the initial states being the set of common initial states of A and B. Definition 4.8 stipulates that, when there is no transient fault in the network, the corrector program is transparent, i.e., it does not interfere with the working of the code dissemination protocol and satisfies the strong code dissemination. However, when transient faults are occurring, then the corrector program will help the code dissemination protocol to eventually guarantee that a node will permanently download the updated code, after possibly having downloaded stale code.
THEORETICAL RESULTS
In this section, we show that (i) it is impossible to solve the strong code dissemination problem in presence of transient faults, and (ii) there exists no 1-local algorithm to solve the strong code dissemination problem in the presence of a stronger class of transient faults, which we term as detectable faults.
Strong Code Dissemination in the Presence of Transient Faults
In this section, we investigate the possibility of developing an algorithm that solves the strong code dissemination problem in the presence of transient faults. Ideally, even in the presence of transient faults, it would be beneficial if a node only updates with new code to prevent redundant downloads, thereby saving energy.
Intuition From the specification of deterministic code dissemination (Definition 4.5), it is stated that nodes only update their codes when they are in the presence of a newer code fragment. However, when transient faults occur, the version number that is advertised by or stored at a node can be corrupted, possibly leading to nodes downloading old code fragments. Thus, the first main contribution of the paper is captured by Theorem 5.1, which states that it is impossible to solve the strong code dissemination in the presence of transient faults.
Theorem 5.1 (Impossibility of strong CD). Given a network G = (V, A), a fault model F that corrupts the program state, and an updated code fragment (Π, v Π ). Then, there exists no deterministic algorithm that solves the strong code dissemination problem for Π in G in the presence of F .
Proof.
Consider the network G, and assume a deterministic algorithm Ψ that solves the strong code dissemination problem. We will construct an appropriate state and show that, under Ψ, a node may wrongly update, hence a contradiction.
Assumptions: Two nodes n i and n j where n i (resp. n j ) is both an upstream and downstream neighbour of n j (resp. n i ).
Consider a fault free computation C = s 0 · s 1 . . . of Ψ. In a given state s k in C, two nodes n i , n j ∈ V \ {S} have the following code fragments: n i has Π and n j has π. Now, nodes n i and n j interact such that n i and n j inform each other of their respective code fragments, i.e., about their respective version numbers. Given that Ψ solves the strong code dissemination problem, node n j will eventually permanently update its code with Π in a state s l , l > k as Π is an updated code fragment. Now, consider a faulty computation C = s 0 · s 1 . . . of Ψ, and a state s k which is exactly the same as s k (above) except for the following: (i) node n i has a code fragment (Π ni , v Πn i ) and node n j has code fragment (π nj , v πn j ). In a state s l , l > k of C , assume that n i has the same version view as n j in s l and n j has the same version view as n i in s l .
Since Ψ is deterministic and solves strong CD, node n i will permanently update its code with π in s l , which is a contradiction as π is an old code. Hence, no such deterministic Ψ exists.
The impossibility is underpinned by some major problems, the most prominent being: (i) Nodes are not able to detect unexpected version numbers as, for example, if nodes with the stale code have their respective version numbers corrupted to very high values, old code may propagate through out the network, and (ii) nodes with the updated code may have their respective version numbers corrupted to that of the old code, while nodes with the old code have their respective version numbers corrupted to the new one, i.e., all updated nodes appear as outdated and all outdated nodes appear as updated.
To attempt to circumvent this impossibility of Theorem 5.1, there are different possible avenues. For example, one may allow algorithms to make a finite number of mistakes, thereby solving a weaker problem specification (such as the weak code dissemination). Another example might be to solve the strong code dissemination problem in presence of a stronger fault model, i.e., a fault model where the set of possible corruptions is constrained. For the first possibility, if the possibly few updated nodes are overwritten with the old code, then there is no chance of the network getting the new code. Thus, even if a finite number of mistakes are allowed (i.e., download of old code), then there is no guarantee of the network getting the correct code. Thus, in this paper, we follow the second possibility, i.e., we assume a stronger fault model. Thus, the assumed fault model needs to be such that the two stated problems are handled: we require the faults to result in detectable errors. Thus, we rule out a few fault actions: (i) we require that the fault model does neither make outdated nodes appear as updated and updated as outdated, (ii) nodes in a neighbourhood need to be corrupted differently (so nodes in a neighbourhood do not appear as outdated/updated). We call the resulting fault model as the detectable fault model, which we assume in the rest of the paper. An example of a possible fault ruled out by the first constraint can be illustrated with an example: assume the old code version is 1 and the new version is 2, and the version number increases by 1 for each new update. An updated (resp. outdated) node cannot have its version number to be corrupted to 1 (resp. 2). Also, say a node n has its version number corrupted to 5, then a node m in n's neighbourhood cannot have its version number corrupted to 6, as m will appear as updated to n.
In the presence of detectable faults, a trivial solution to solve the strong code dissemination is to require the sink to periodically start the dissemination process. Whenever a node encounters a version that is unexpected (allowed under the detectable fault model), it does not need to download the code associated with it. When it sees a version number that is expected (i.e., realistic), and since the code associated with the version number cannot be a stale one (as it is ruled out by the fault model), the node can download the code. Unfortunately, such a scheme is expensive as the network will need to spend lots of energy for dissemination, i.e., the protocol is a global one. Thus, we seek to determine whether nodes can rely only on its 1-hop neighbourhood for code dissemination (just as in a fault-free case) in the presence of detectable faults. This is captured in Theorem 5.2.
S. Saginbekov, A. Jhumka Theorem 5.2 (Impossibility of 1-local strong CD). Given a network G = (V, A), a detectable fault model F , and an updated code fragment Π. Then, there exists no 1-local algorithm that solves the strong code dissemination problem for Π in G in the presence of F .
The proof is trivial.
If the 1-hop neighbourhood of a node is corrupted in such a way that the version numbers are either unexpected ones or old ones, then the node will not download any code. Hence, a 1-local protocol is not possible.
Intuitively, if a neighbourhood is corrupted by a detectable fault model, then nodes will need to start downloading from uncorrupted nodes outside of the corrupted neighbourhood. Hence, this points towards a f -local algorithm, where f is the diameter of the affected area, that can solve the strong code dissemination algorithm. However, given the nature of WSNs and of the code dissemination process, strong code dissemination in the presence of faults is not appropriate, due to the overhead it induces on the network. To this end, we focus on the two other specifications, viz. best effort CD and consistent CD. In the next section, we present two corrector programs that, when added to a fault-intolerant code dissemination protocol, solve the BestEffort CD and Consistent CD problems.
CODE DISSEMINATION CORRECTION: TWO GENERIC CORRECTOR PROTO-COLS
In this section, we present two generic corrector programs, namely (i) BestEffort-Repair and (ii) Consistent-Repair. Each of the two protocols can be added to a fault-intolerant code dissemination protocol to make the code dissemination protocol satisfy some correctness specification. As stated before, rather than developing a single (non-masking) fault-tolerant code dissemination protocol, the focus in on transforming existing faultintolerant code dissemination protocols into nonmasking fault-tolerant ones. To enable this, we adopt the technique for graybox stabilisation [18] whereby, rather than developing a corrector for a particular code dissemination protocol, a (generic) corrector protocol is designed based on a specification. This corrector can then be added to any implementation that satisfies the specification, resulting in the eventual program to be non-masking fault-tolerant. In that way, the corrector is reusable.
Further, from the definition of a corrector component (Definition 4.8), the corrector should be transparent to the code dissemination protocol when there are no faults is the network, i.e., the behaviour of the composite corrector and dissemination protocol should be identical to that of the dissemination protocol alone in the absence of faults. To achieve this, we include a detector component in the code dissemination protocol that, when satisfied (during faulty periods), triggers the corrector component. It would be advantageous to then be able to develop a detector based on a specification. However, in such a case, the efficiency of the detector is not very high, in that it can suffer from high false positives or false negatives, which can then cause the corrector to violate its transparency property. To compensate, we design the detectors based on protocol implementations, i.e., a detector is needed for each different code dissemination protocol. Overall, our approach is to develop a protocol-specific detector which, when its corresponding detection predicate becomes true, triggers the execution of the generic corrector program, making the code dissemination protocol non-masking fault-tolerant.
A design methodology suggested for graybox stabilisation is to design a program that contains two different components [18] : (i) a process-specific component and (ii) an interprocess-specific component. The processspecific component is responsible for making the state of a single process consistent, whereas an interprocessspecific component is responsible for correcting any inconsistency between different processes. In a faultintolerant code dissemination protocol, since the only relevant information nodes keep about the code is the version number, then state inconsistency at the process level is irrelevant, i.e., the state of a single process is trivially consistent. On the other hand, state inconsistency can be detected when comparing the version numbers of two different processes. Thus, interprocessspecific component of a corrector program only needs to correct the states of processes that are inconsistent with each other.
In Sections 6.1 and 6.2, we present two corrector protocols that correct any state inconsistency between processes, transforming the fault-intolerant code dissemination protocols in non-masking fault-tolerant ones. The BestEffort-Repair protocol, as the name suggests, attempts to correct the state inconsistencies as fast as possible, while the Consistent-Repair protocol attempts to correct the state consistencies as intelligently as possible. In other words, the worst case scenario for BestEffort-Repair may be worse than that of the Consistent-Repair but the best case scenario for BestEffort-Repair is also better than that of ConsistentRepair.
The BestEffort-Repair Protocol
Before describing the BestEffort-Repair protocol and giving its formal description, we present the main idea behind it, and the special packets it uses. Since 1-local fault tolerance is not possible (Theorem 5.2), the main idea is to correct (i.e., repair) the protocol state as fast as possible. Correcting a state inconsistency (i.e., error) quickly means that the error does not propagate through out the whole network.
BestEffort-Repair uses six special types of data packets (we call them BestEffort-Repair packets), which we describe below.
• Prob: It contains the code's version number and it is used to ask a neighbouring node to correct an error.
• Check: A node sends a Check packet to request the current version number of neighbouring nodes.
• Rep: A node sends a Rep packet in response to a Check packet and it contains the node's (stored) version number.
• OK: It is used to release some nodes from the correction process.
• Cor: A node sends a Cor packet to inform other neighbouring nodes about the correct version number.. • Hello: A node sends a Hello packet to inform other neighbouring nodes about the correct version number and also that it has the updated code.
Informally, BestEffort-Repair works as follows: When a node n 1 detects an error after communicating with a node n 2 , it attempts to correct the erroneous state. A Prob packet is sent by n 1 to n 2 to indicate a problem, asking n 2 to correct the problem. If the error cannot be corrected by n 2 , then Check packets are broadcast, creating a correction tree, rooted at the node (n 1 ) that detected the error. The leaf nodes of the tree responds to Check packets by sending Rep packets. If n 2 detects an error with any of the leaf nodes, it will spawn a subtree, within the main correction tree. Once a region in the network is reached where no fault has occurred, i.e., outside of the fault-affected area, then no more subtree is spawned. This means that a node's, say n l , neighbourhood (i.e., all the children of the node within the correction tree) have the same code version, as the version is correct (under the detectable fault model). In other words, n l has received Rep packets from its children with the same version number. Then, ultimately, the node n l responds through a Hello or Cor packet, and its subtree "disappears". Any node sending a Hello or Cor packet will cause its subtree to "disappear" since the node has ascertained the correct version number (and in the case of Hello packet, n l also notified its parent about the availability of the code as well).
BestEffort-Repair: An Overview
When a node n 1 detects an error (which is protocolspecific) after receiving a message from a neighbouring node n 2 , n 1 sends a Prob packet to n 2 , thereby asking n 2 to check whether it is the source of the error (we will shortly explain what happens if n 2 does not receive the Prob packet from n 1 ). Node n 1 then goes to the Wait state, where n 1 will wait for some predefined time. In turn, n 2 asks its neighbouring nodes, except n 1 , for their version numbers by broadcasting a Check packet. Node n 2 then goes to the Waitrep state where it will wait for Rep packets from its neighbours over a certain time interval. All nodes that receive the Check packet from n 2 send a Rep packet to n 2 . Now, node n 2 will compare all the received version numbers obtained from the Rep packets. If the version numbers are equal and match its own version number, then n 2 sends a Hello packet to n 1 . By sending a Hello packet, node n 2 says to node n 1 that it has the correct version and it has the associated code too. Now, if the received version numbers from the Rep packets are the same but differ from that of n 2 , node n 2 will send a Cor packet to n 1 and corrects its code fragment by downloading from one of the Rep senders. By sending a Cor packet to n 1 , node n 2 tells n 1 about the currently available version, which n 1 can download from another node with the associated code. If at least one of the received Rep packets contains a different version number i.e., the received version numbers are not identical, then n 2 goes to the Wait state and broadcasts a Prob packet, as done by n 1 earlier. This process continues until a node that sent a Prob packet will get a Hello or Cor packet. Nodes that were in the Wait or Waitrep state after updating their code fragments, go to the Temp state where they broadcast a Hello packet a few times.
Because of reasons such as transient link failures, a Prob packet sent by n 1 may not be delivered to n 2 . To overcome this issue n 1 periodically sends a Prob packet to n 2 some predefined times until n 1 receives an implicit acknowledgement packet like Check, OK or Prob from n 2 or Hello or Cor from any node. Figure 1 illustrates the state machine of BestEffortRepair. The variables and (pseudo) code for the BestEffort-Repair algorithm is shown in Figures 2  and 3 .
We now prove that BestEffort-Repair is a corrector component.
S. Saginbekov, A. Jhumka
Variables of process i:
PacketType ∈ {H, P rob, Check, Hello, OK, Rep} % H packets are application layer(data)/ code update maintenance packets. % The other packets are Repair packets. Proof From BestEffort-Repair, a node n, after sending Check packets to its neighbours -due to receiving a Prob packet from a node n , waits for Rep packets. If the received Rep packets are all identical in their version numbers, then n will either broadcast a Cor packet (stating the expected correct version number and then download the code) or it will broadcast a Hello packet. If the version number is the old one, then, n will download the old code. All other nodes that receive the Hello packet will also download the old code. Thus, at most, all nodes in m ∈ G and all nodes p ∈ M u will receive a Hello packet with the version number being the old one.
From Lemma 6.1, it can be observed that only a finite number of nodes, including updated ones, will change their code to the old one in presence of transient faults. Since there will then be the old code and the new code in the network, eventually, the code dissemination protocol will ensure that all nodes get the updated code. This is captured in Theorem 6.1 Theorem 6.1 (Correctness of BestEffort-Repair). Given a network G = (V, A), detectable fault model F , a strong code dissemination specification σ for G, BestEffort CD σ b , a protocol Σ that satisfies σ in the absence of F but violates σ in the presence of F . Then, BestEffort-Repair is a BestEffort-corrector component for strong CD.
Proof.
For the transparency property, since BestEffort-Repair is only triggered when there is an error in the network, then safety is satisfied by the correctness of Σ. The stabilizing property follows from Lemma 6.1 and the nodes will the old code with ultimately download the correct code due to Σ.
The Consistent-Repair Protocol
Consistent-Repair: An Overview
Consistent-Repair works in a similar way to BestEffortRepair, with differences when a node changes its code.
When a node n 1 detects an error (which is protocolspecific) after receiving a message from a neighbouring node n 2 , n 1 sends a Prob packet to n 2 , thereby asking n 2 to check whether it is the source of the error (we will shortly explain what happens if n 2 does not receive the Prob packet from n 1 ). Node n 1 then goes to the Wait state, where n 1 will wait for some predefined time. In turn, n 2 asks its neighbouring nodes, except n 1 , for their version numbers by broadcasting a Check packet. Node n 2 then goes to the Waitrep state, where it will wait for Rep packets from its neighbours over a certain time interval. All nodes that receive the Check packet from n 2 send a Rep packet to n 2 . Now, node n 2 will compare all the received version numbers obtained from the Rep packets.
If all the received version numbers are equal and match its own version number, then n 2 sends a Hello packet to n 1 , stating that the correct version number is that held by n 2 and that it has the updated code too. If the received version numbers from the Rep packets are the same but differ from that of n 2 , n 2 downloads the available code fragment by downloading from one of the Rep senders. After downloading the code, n 2 will eventually send Hello messages. Further, if there are only two different version numbers received, then n 2 chooses the higher one (as there are only two versions in the network during the dissemination process).
On the other hand, if n 2 obtains more than 2 version numbers, then this indicate an error in the network. For any node n 3 that sent Rep packets to n 2 with version numbers that violate the consistency predicate, n 2 send Prob packets to n 3 . These nodes, in turn, send check packets to their neighbours and the process is repeated.
Once the recovery process reaches a region outside of the fault-affected area, nodes on the border of the faultaffected area will receive Rep packets with at most two different version numbers (this is the case when only part of a neighbourhood has been updated). Once a node receiving these Rep packets decides on the correct version number, it broadcasts a Hello message (after possibly downloading the associated code, if it does not already have it) a few times to ensure that its neighborhood learns about the correct version.
Because of reasons such as transient link failures, a Prob packet sent by n 1 may not be received by n 2 . To overcome this issue, n 1 periodically sends a Prob packet to n 2 for some predefined times until n 1 receives an implicit acknowledgement packet, such as Hello or Check.
The Consistent-Repair protocol, when added to a fault-intolerant code dissemination protocols, transforms the protocol into a non-masking fault-tolerant one that satisfies the Consistent CD specification. It leverages the fact that, at any time during the new code dissemination, there will be at most two codes in the network: (i) the old one and (ii) the new one. This means that any node only need to know about two different version numbers. Once a node knows about these, it can choose the higher one, which is associated with the updated code.
The Consistent-Repair protocol is shown in Figure 4 , which shows the code for when the process is in state 2 (Wait) and state 3 (Wait-Rep) is shown (the code for when the process is in state 1, 4 and 5 is the same as for BestEffort-Repair (Figure 3) ). On the other hand, Figure 5 illustrates the state machine of the ConsistentRepair protocol.
An example of a fault-affected area is depicted in Figure 6 , and the corresponding correction tree for the fault-affected area, as constructed by ConsistentRepair, is depicted in Figure 7 .
We prove an important property of Consistent- Repair, in that Consistent-Repair generates a correction tree of depth at most f + 2, where f is the diameter of the F -affected area.
Lemma 6.2 (Correction Tree). Given a network G = (V, A), a detectable fault model F , and an F -affected area G , with the diameter of the area being f . Then, Consistent-Repair constructs a tree of depth at most f + 2 rooted at the node that first detects an error.
Proof:
Assumptions: We denote a node that first detects an error by n 0 , and we denote a node a distance d from n 0 by n d 0 . We assume that node n 0 detects an error after receiving a packet from some node n 1 0 , and that n 0 is on the boundary of the F -affected area (some of its neighbours are F -affected, some are not), and f > 1.
According to Consistent-Repair, n 0 will send a Prob packet to n , since the diameter of the F -affected area is f , this means that n 1 0 will eventually send Prob packets to all senders of faulty Rep packets. We focus on one such node, which we denote by n 2 0 . This process spawns a (sub)tree, with n 1 0 as the root of the subtree, and node n 2 0 will send Check packets to its neighbours (see Figure 7) . When the node n f 0 (at the other end of the F -affected area is reached), in the worst case, it will detect faulty Rep packet from at least one node, which we denote by n f +1 0 (at a distance of f + 1 from n 0 ). It will then send a Prob packet to n f +1 0 , which, in turn, sends Check packets to its neighbours at a distance of f + 2. Since the F -affected area is of diameter f , all of the Rep packets to node n f +1 0 will hold at most two version numbers (and the tree does not grow anymore). At this point, node n f +1 0 can decide on an appropriate version number. Hence, the tree is of a depth of at most f + 2.
In effect, when a node sends a Prob or Check packet, new subtrees are created, and the depth of the tree increases by 1. When a node receives identical information from its children, it sends a Hello packet to its parent, indicating that it has the associated code. At this point, the dependency of its children ends, reducing the depth of the tree by 1. It should be further noted that a tree is constructed for every node that detects an error. So, at any point in time, there may be several correction trees in the network.
We now prove the correctness of Consistent-Repair. A) , a detectable fault model F , and an Faffected area G of diameter f . Then, Consistent-Repair guarantees that, eventually, all nodes in G will have a Proof. We will prove by induction on the correction tree (see Lemma 6.2) that node n 0 , and all nodes in G , will eventually download the correct code.
Theorem 6.2 (f -local correction). Given a network G = (V,
Assumptions: (i) We assume a node n 0 has downloaded the stale code, (ii) node n 0 has detected an error (state inconsistency) (i.e., node n 0 is the root of the correction tree). We will denote a node at a distance d from another node n 0 by n d 0 .
Base case:
We prove for the case of a node, which we denote by n f +1 0 at depth = f + 1 (i.e., the last rooted subtree). Node n f +1 0 will eventually receive a set of Rep packets with identical version numbers. Node n f +1 0 will then eventually download the correct code from one of the Rep packets senders.
Inductive hypothesis:
Assume that a node n i 0 , where 0 < i ≤ f , eventually receives a Hello packet from a node n i+1 0 and then updates its code. Inductive Step:
We need to prove that a node n i−1 0 , a neighbour node of n i 0 , eventually receives a Hello packet and updates its code.
In Consistent-Repair, node n i 0 will broadcast Hello packets periodically up to h times after receiving a Hello packet or having updated its code. If node n can download the code from the node it receives the Hello packet from.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
In this section, we present the deployment and simulation setup used to evaluate the working and performance of both BestEffort-Repair and ConsistentRepair. We subsequently present the results of each experiment for both protocols. The setup was identical for both protocols.
Deployment and Simulation Setup
Deployment To assess the proper working of both protocols, we conducted both a deployment and simulation experiments.
For the deployment experiments, we implemented both protocols on TinyOS-2.1 [47] and performed indoor experiments using CM5000 sensor motes, which are based on the TelosB platform design. We used 10 motes in our deployment experiments, setting the transmission power of each node to a very low level 2. Simulation To evaluate the overhead of both protocols in large scale networks, we conducted simulation experiments using TOSSIM [19] as simulator. The network topology used is a 20*20 grid, with the distance between two nodes set at around 10 ft, with nodes having a communication radius of 30 ft. The network topology with asymmetric links is constructed by a tool given on tinyos.net. Each node is given a noise model from the heavy-meyer noise trace file located in Tossim/noise folder.
The parameter values for the various timers of both protocols used in our deployment and simulation experiments are given in Table 1 .
Some of the parameter values depend on other parameters. For example, WaitRep Time is the time for waiting for Rep packets after broadcasting a Check packet. So, WaitRep Time ≥ SendCheck +SendRep. Wait Time should be set according to the code size and the size of the network. If the network and code size is large, this time should be large enough to allow neighbouring nodes to correct their code and forward it. Usually nodes enter the Temp state from the Wait state where it waits for a shorter time. The only case when a node waits for Wait Time is when there is a packet loss. Temp Time time is independent of other parameters. The value of t should be small because a node waits a maximum of SendProb time units to receive all possible Prob packets. The values of h and p can be set to any value.
In our experiments, each node periodically broadcasts an application packet (or any other traffic that drives the dissemination) H, with the period randomly selected between [0, U ] at the start.
Scenarios: Simulation and Experiments
Simulation Scenarios
In our simulations, we simulated two scenarios: (i) Scenario 1: we varied the number of corrupted nodes per circular area, which has diameter of 60 feet (varying the fault density), and (ii) Scenario 2: we kept the number of corrupted nodes to 5 and increased the size of a given (square) area, i.e., decrease the fault density. In both scenarios, the nodes to be corrupted were selected randomly in the given area. We then counted (i) the number of Repair packets (BestEffort-Repair or Consistent-Repair) sent, (ii) the number of involved nodes, i.e., nodes that sent at least one Repair packet, and (iii) the number of nodes which changed their states to Wait and/or WaitRep states. For each given number of corrupted nodes in the first scenario and for each length of square area in the second scenario, we ran the simulations 5 times and computed the min, average and max values over the 5 runs.
Experimental Scenarios
Our implementation of BestEffort-Repair takes 222 bytes of memory, which includes two tables (TableProb and TableRep -see Figure 2 ), each of size 50 entries of 2 bytes each, and other algorithm related variables. Depending on the size of the network, the size of the tables can be varied. On the other hand, our implementation of Consistent-Repair takes 144 bytes, which includes 3 arrays of size 3*2, with each entry of size 2 bytes. Our claim is that both BestEffort-Repair and Consistent-Repair can help any code dissemination protocol that has enough state to enable the detection of an erroneous state to eventually guarantee that every node has the updated code. As a result, we tested both BestEffort-Repair and Consistent-Repair by adding them to Varuna [4] , one of the latest code dissemination protocols, on three different network topologies under four different scenarios. In the first scenario, the network was complete where all nodes could communicate with each other. In the second scenario, the network topology was formed by placing a faulty node at one end of the network in such a way that it has only one neighbour, with the network remaining connected and multi-hop (See Figure 8) . In the third scenario, the topology was formed by randomly deploying the nodes such that the network is connected and multi-hop. In these three scenarios, only one node is used as a faulty node with a corrupted version number or corrupted neighbourhood table, since Varuna's state consists of a neighbourhood table and a variable holding the version number. Finally, in the fourth scenario, the network topology that is used is the same as that used in scenario three, but with two faulty nodes: one with the version number corrupted and the other with the neighbourhood table corrupted.
Faults were artificially injected in Varuna by changing the version number and/or neighbourhood table entries of the faulty nodes. Recall that both BestEffort-Repair and Consistent-Repair is executed only when an error (i.e., erroneous state) is detected, so the faults injected were such that variables were modified in such a way to trigger an error that will be detected, leading to the execution of Repair. In all tests, the faulty node(s) were booted after all correct nodes were successfully booted so as to assess the impact of faulty nodes on a dissemination process that is already in progress.
BestEffort-Repair
Simulation Results
Number of nodes: From Figure 9 (a), we observe that, on average, the number of nodes executing the protocol varies linearly with the number of corrupted nodes. Given that the number of nodes involved is much less than the size of the network, it indicates that the number of nodes involved in the stabilisation process is proportional to the size of the corrupted area. Further, in Figure 9 (b), we observe that, as the size of the area is increased (i.e., fault density decreases), the number of nodes executing the protocol becomes almost constant, on the average. This is because, with decreasing fault density, most faults tend to appear as a single independent fault, with each of them involving a similar number of nodes, and may only involve at most their 2-hop neighbourhood. This implies that, in general, BestEffort-Repair tends to access only a bounded neighbourhood (similar to Consistent-Repair). Number of packets: We notice a similar trend in Figure 10 that supports the observation that, in general, BestEffort-Repair tends to access a bounded neighbourhood. In Figure 10 (a), we observe that the number of Repair packets sent varies linearly with the number of corrupted nodes. Since the number of Repair messages sent is much less than the size of the network, it implies that only part of the network was involved in the stabilisation process.
The discrepancy between the maximum number and minimum number of nodes or Repair packets is often due to the link quality, making retransmissions necessary.
Experimental Results
In our experiments, we measured (i) the number of transmitted Repair packets and (ii) the latency required to correct the error. For each scenario, we ran Repair 20 times and computed the average of the Repair packets and latency.
As expected, in all of our experiments, adding BestEffort-Repair to Varuna ultimately corrected the errors. The results obtained for scenarios 1 . . . 4 are shown in Tables 2, 3 , 4, and 5 respectively. In all cases, the average number of Repair packets and the latency are reasonably low. For example, focusing on Table 2 , the minimum number of Repair packets is proportional to the size of the neighbourhood of the faulty node. This is as expected since most nodes are expected to send Rep packets due to the network being complete. The difference between minimum and maximum values is due to the loss characteristics of the wireless medium. For example, in the case (see Table 5 ) where the highest latency among all experiments was 218, 218 milliseconds and the largest number of packet transmissions was 82 can show this property. In that particular case, Prob packets sent by a node that detected the error was not received by a receiver. Therefore, the node had to retransmit Prob packets and the number of Prob packet retransmissions was 29 and the time taken for that was about 155, 000 milliseconds.
Consistent-Repair
Simulation Results
We now present the result of simulation experiments of Consistent-Repair. Number of nodes: From Figure 11 (a), we observe that, on average, the number of nodes executing the Consistent-Repair varies linearly with the number of corrupted nodes. Given that the number of nodes involved is much less than the size of the network, it implies that the number of nodes involved in the stabilisation process is proportional to the size of the corrupted area. We also observe, in Figure 11(b) , that, as the size of the area within which faults occur is increased (i.e., fault density decreases), the number of nodes executing the protocol becomes almost constant, on the average. This is because, with the decreasing fault density, most faults tend to appear as single independent faults, i.e., the fault-affected area is of size 1. Each corrupted node may only involve at most their 2-hop neighbourhood during recovery. These two observations support the fact that Consistent-Repair in f -local, with f being the diameter of the fault-affected region. Number of packets: We observe a similar trend in Figure 12 that supports the f -locality property of Consistent-Repair. In Figure 12 (a), we observe that the number of Repair packets sent varies linearly with the number of corrupted nodes. Since the number of Repair messages sent is much less than the size of the network, it implies that only part of the network was involved in the stabilisation process.
As in the case with BestEffort-Repair, the discrepancy between the maximum number and minimum number of nodes for Consistent-Repair packets is often due to the link quality, making retransmissions necessary.
Experimental Results
As expected, in all of our experiments, adding Consistent-Repair to Varuna ultimately corrected the errors. The results obtained for scenarios 1 . . . 4 are shown in Tables 6, 7 , 8, and 9 respectively. In all cases, the average number of Repair packets and the latency are reasonably low. For example, focusing on Table 6 , the minimum number of Repair packets is proportional to the size of the neighbourhood of the faulty node (as in the case for BestEffort-Repair). This is as expected since most nodes are expected to send Rep packets due to the network being complete. The difference between minimum and maximum values is due to the loss characteristics of the wireless. , it can be observed that, in general, Consistent-Repair involves more messages and nodes. This is due to the fact that, given that Consistent-Repair makes more informed decisions to prevent any erroneous downloads, more nodes are involved and, thus, they send more messages.
On the other hand, given that BestEffort-Repair is biased towards fast recovery, it attempts to make the network state consistent again, even if erroneous downloads are involved. It can also be noted from Tables 2 to 5 (for BestEffortRepair) and Tables 6 to 9 (for Consistent-Repair) that (i) the best case for BestEffort-Repair (i.e., minimum , maximum values) is, in general, worse than that of Consistent-Repair. As mentioned earlier, BestEffortRepair can, in the worst case, involve the whole network during recovery, as opposed to Consistent-Repair which will only involve its f + 2 hop neighbourhood. In the best case, BestEffort-Repair may receive the proper Hello message first and helps the affected area to receiver quickly, whereas Consistent-Repair will wait for several messages to arrive before reaching the decision.
CASE STUDY: ADDING BESTEFFORT-REPAIR AND CONSISTENT-REPAIR TO VARUNA
In this section, we discuss the addition of BestEffortRepair and Consistent-Repair to Varuna [4] . The reason for choosing Varuna is that it is one of the latest code dissemination protocols that have been proposed. The code that was used in the deployment was reused for the simulation experiments described in this section. As mentioned before, both protocols are triggered by the detection of an error in the state of the code dissemination protocol, in this case Varuna. In Varuna, such a detection is enabled by one of the following conditions: (i) two nodes' version numbers are corrupted in such a way that the difference in versions is strictly greater than 1, and (ii) the receiver of an advertisement message finds that its version is bigger than the advertised one and, at the same time, the sender of the message exists in its neighbourhood table. Also, we disallow faults, under the detectable fault model, that cause old code to appear as new and new as old (i.e., all updated nodes have old version numbers and non-updated nodes have the new version number). Also, this disallows nodes to be corrupted in identical ways.
We simulated the composite protocol of Varuna and BestEffort-Repair and Consistent-Repair in TOSSIM. All nodes, except faulty nodes, are booted in the first minute. Faulty nodes are located at the center of a grid network of 20*20. A packet with new version number is injected after 2 minutes. We simulated three faulty scenarios: (i) with 1 fault, (ii) with 4 faults and (iii) with 7 faults. For each faulty scenario, we booted the faulty nodes (i) 30 seconds, (ii) 45 seconds, and (iii) 60 seconds. This is so that only a proportion of nodes has the updated code version. The reason for booting faulty nodes some time after the updated code is injected is to ensure that nodes that have the stale code are chosen to have faults injected into them. We are specifically interested in (i) the overhead induced by Repair on the performance of Varuna and (ii) the number of nodes with correct code at a given time. We simulated Varuna in conditions similar to those detailed in Section 7. Further, the values for Varuna-specific parameters are: DISS-RAND=2 sec, ADV-RAND=2 sec, τ =8 sec, T M OODY =1 min. We first start with a special case where simulated the situation where, due to situations such as duty cycling, some nodes may have been sleeping, missing the code update. In Figure 13 , 4 such nodes are booted 180 seconds after the code update has been injected into the network. Further, these 4 nodes are faulty as well. We observe that, in Varuna, all nodes in the network eventually end up downloading the stale code, while the composite protocol of Varuna and either Repair protocol ensures that the whole network has the updated code.
From Figures 14, 15 
Packet Overhead
In Figure 17 (a), it can be seen that the packets overhead induced by Repair on Varuna is low. Specifically, with 4 faulty nodes, the packet overhead is 0.4% while, with 7 faulty nodes, the packet overhead is less than 3%. From Figure 10 , it can be observed that the number of Repair packets will increase linearly with increasing number of corrupted nodes. The reason for the linear increase (as opposed to a constant value) is that the fault density increases when more corrupted appear at the centre of the network (condition under which we simulated the composite protocol).
Temporal Overhead
In Figure 17 (b), it can be observed that the whole network receives the new code in approximately 80 seconds, after the new code has been injected into the network. Further, it can be observed that, when there are faulty nodes in the network, the time for the whole network to receive the correct code is approximately 80 seconds. Thus, there is almost no temporal overhead induced by BestEffort-Repair on Varuna, highlighting the fact that BestEffort-Repair is biased towards fast recovery.
Performance of Consistent-Repair
From Figures 18, 19 and 20, we make one important observation: When Consistent-Repair is added to Varuna, every node eventually downloads the correct code.
Packet Overhead
In Figure 21 , it can be seen that the packets overhead induced by Consistent-Repair on Varuna is very low. Specifically, with 4 faulty nodes, the packet overhead is less than 0.8% (see Figure 21) . From Figure 12 , it can be observed that the number of Repair packets will increase linearly with increasing number of corrupted nodes. The reason for the linear increase (as opposed to a constant value) is that the fault density increases when more corrupted appear at the centre of the network (condition under which we simulated the composite protocol).
Temporal Overhead
In Figure 17( hand, we motivated Consistent-Repair to allow for more informed recovery in that it reduces the number of erroneous downloads (where an updated node ends up downloading the old code to eventually update again). In this respect, in our experiments, we observed that, on average, BestEffort-Repair causes 5 erroneous downloads -which is allowed under the BestEffort CD specification (to eventually download the correct code), whereas, with Consistent-Repair, there were no erroneous downloads.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss some issues arising from our approach in a Q&A style.
• Was it not possible to design generic detectors, similar to the design of generic correctors proposed in the paper?
We have addressed the problems caused by corrupted code dissemination program state induced by transient faults. We have proposed two generic corrector protocols that correct the inconsistency in code dissemination protocols, and are triggered by protocol-specific detectors. This means that, for such detectors, an in-depth understanding of the protocol involved is needed. It may be argued that a generic detector can be used. For example, it may be suggested that a hash of the code and version number is piggybacked onto messages. A receiver node can then compute its own hash and version number and then compare to detect errors. However, the above scheme will not work for a number of reasons:
1. Our fault model assumes that transient faults will corrupt the state of the code dissemination protocol, as opposed to corrupting the code itself. 2. As the code dissemination protocol executes, different nodes will have different version numbers (old or new). Then, using the hash of the code and version number will not work. 3. Corruption of variables other than the version numbers can still lead to the code dissemination protocols not working properly (e.g., in Varuna, corrupting the neighbourhood table caused problems), and is not captured by the above scheme. 4. Further, we also believe such an approach to be unsuitable for WSNs, given that specific hardware is needed for encoding and decoding the checksums, though such hardware is cheap.
Scenario 1 Version corrupted
What this means is that, in general, a generic detector would miss some errors, leading to erroneous downloads of code or, in the worst case, the whole network having the old code. In fact, it was suggested in [48] that the efficiency of generic detectors tend to be not very high [48] , meaning that these detectors can have a high false positive, thereby triggering the corrector protocols unnecessarily, or false negative rate, whereby codes may download the wrong code.
• The two protocols are quite similar. Why do we need both of them? It can be argued that the protocols are quite similar to each other. Though the differences are not major, they are geared for specific situations. Specifically, BestEffort-Repair is best used when a corrupted node is surrounded by neighbours with the same version number (old or new), while Consistent-Repair is better suited when a corrupted node has at least one updated node nearby. As has been shown, Best-Effort Repair completes faster than Consistent-Repair at the expense of more redundant downloads. For example, if a bug has been detected and the program needs to be updated very quickly, BestEffort-Repair is more suitable. On the other hand, if the program needs updated (due to, say, a change in requirements), then Consistent-Repair will be more appropriate. Nevertheless, as future work, we plan on investigating the design of an adaptive code dissemination protocol based on the position of a corrupted node in the network.
In such a case, in a fault-affected area, some nodes will execute BestEffort-Repair and others Consistent-Repair. Thus, since BestEffort-Repair is geared towards fast recovery, the fact that it is surrounded by nodes with the same version number makes it state consistent during recovery. Further, Consistent-Repair guarantees a f -local correction (f being the diameter of the affected area), while BestEffort-Repair is a global algorithm, involving, in the worst case, the whole network. However, in the general case, BestEffort-Repair rarely needs the whole network for correction, requiring the O(f )-hop neighbourhood.
• How realistic is the detectable fault model?
The detectable fault model disallows two types of fault actions: (i) nodes in a neighbourhood to be identically corrupted and (ii) for nodes with the old (resp. new) code to appear as new (resp. old). Though these faults can actually in practice, the probability of such faults to occur is very low. If these faults do occur, then it is impossible to guarantee that dissemination of the new code will terminate properly. One way to circumvent this problem is to require the sink to query the network after some time to determine if nodes have the proper code, using possibly a hash of the code and the version number.
• Are the correctors themselves resilient to transient faults?
The theory of detectors and correctors [17] points out that correctors are themselves non-masking fault-tolerant to transient faults, i.e,, they can temporarily violate their safety specification but will satisfy their liveness. So, the two correctors we proposed are non-masking fault-tolerant. This means that it may cause nodes to download erroneous code or have the wrong version numbers but eventually, when faults stop, all the nodes will have the correct versions.
• Will the corrector protocols developed in this paper work for selective reprogramming dissemination protocols?
We believe the answer to be positive. However, there are some preprocessing to be done before they can be applied. Specifically, in WSNs, the network is connected but, for selective reprogramming, the selected nodes may not form a connected (sub)network. Thus, a logical network needs to be built between these nodes, as a kind of network overlay, using techniques such as [49] . Then, the algorithms can be applied on top of the overlay.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of code dissemination in the presence of transient faults that We have conducted in-depth experiments with both corrector protocols: We have shown that BestEffort-Repair allows for fast recovery but can induce erroneous downloads (i.e., an updated node may download an old code). On the other hand, Consistent-Repair only enables consistent downloads. The packet overhead of each protocol has also been shown to be very low. The main contribution of our paper is the automated transformation of a whole class of fault-intolerant code dissemination protocols (such as Varuna, Trickle etc) into non-masking fault-tolerant protocols.
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